The Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) is a well-known standard protocol, mainly used for remotely accessing shell accounts on Unix-like operating systems to perform administrative tasks. As a result, the SSH service has been an appealing target for attackers, aiming to guess root passwords performing dictionary attacks or to directly exploit the service itself. To identify such situations, this article addresses the detection of SSH anomalous connections from an intrusion detection perspective. The main idea is to compare several strategies and approaches for a better detection of SSH-based attacks. To test the classification performance of different classifiers and combinations of them, SSH data coming from a real-world honeynet are gathered and analysed. For comparison purposes and to draw conclusions about data collection, both packet-based and flow data are analysed. A wide range of classifiers and ensembles are applied to these data, as well as different validation schemes for better analysis of the obtained results. The high-rate classification results lead to positive conclusions about the identification of malicious SSH connections.
Introduction
The Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) is a standard application-layer (under the TCP/IP stack) protocol for remote login and is also used for other secure network services over an insecure network. It consists
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of three major components:
• Transport Layer Protocol: it provides server authentication, confidentiality and integrity with perfect forward secrecy.
• User Authentication Protocol: it authenticates the client to the server.
• Connection Protocol: it multiplexes the encrypted tunnel into several logical channels.
The main usage of the SSH protocol is for remotely accessing shell accounts on Unix-like operating systems. As a result, most of the tasks and activities performed over this protocol are related to administrative purposes, such as user management, device configuration, permission assignment, etc. For this reason, the SSH service has been for years an attractive target for attackers, as crucial information travel over it. Intruders then try to guess passwords for malicious purposes, performing dictionary attacks, or to directly exploit the service itself. Weak passwords are targeted as there is no need for attackers to get the password of a root user account; there are many ways to increase the privileges of a user once logged-in. Furthermore, getting SSH access to remote hosts may be one of the first steps for further attacks over SSH tunnelling, such as SPAM sending.
Differentiating from other remote-communication protocols (File Transfer Protocol or Telnet), SSH encrypts the login session as a prevention mechanism to avoid the collection of unencrypted data (passwords and some other crucial data). Actually, SSH was conceived as a secure protocol to replace previous unsecure solutions to run sessions on remote host. However, the SANS Institute's Internet Storm Center [24] keeps monitoring an average of 100,000 targets being attacked on SSH default port number every day on Internet. From time to time, some attack peaks are produced, as the one on March 2014 (8× baseline).
As a result of the above mentioned, being able to distinguish between malicious and benign SSH traffic for server administration may play an indispensable role in defending system administrators against malicious adversaries. This is one of the targets of intrusion detection systems (IDSs) [6, 7, 9] , which have become an essential asset in addition to the computer security infrastructure of most organizations. In the context of computer networks, an IDS can roughly be defined as a tool designed to detect suspicious patterns that may be related to a network or system attack. Intrusion detection (ID) is therefore a field that focuses on the identification of attempted or ongoing attacks on a computer system [host IDS (HIDS)] or network [network IDS (NIDS)]. While prevention mechanisms are aimed at avoiding intrusions, ID relies on the idea that intrusions will succeed and then they must be identified for security response. In this case, identification of SSH anomalous connections while they are being run certainly is an important task as it may reduce the impact of attacks, thanks to abortion mechanisms.
The aim of this study is to assess data collection, classifiers and ensembles in the useful task of detecting bad-intentioned SSH connections. As a result, best practices for SSH connection filtering may be proposed. To do so, real data, coming from the Euskalert honeynet [10] , are gathered and analysed as described in the remaining sections of the article.
A honeypot has no authorized function or productive value within the corporate network other than to be explored, attacked or compromised [4] . Thus, a honeypot should not receive any traffic at all. Any connection attempt with a honeypot is then an attack or attempt to compromise the device or service that it is offering. From the security point of view, there is a great deal of information that may be learnt from a honeypot about a hacker's tools and methods to improve the protection of information systems.
In a honeynet, all the traffic received by the sensors is suspicious by default. Thus, every packet should be considered as an attack or at least as a piece of a multistep attack. But, in the case of SSH, a honeynet also receives legitimate connections for the administration of the honeynet itself.
As a result, for this study, data from 'normal' SSH connections are also available. Numerous studies propose the use of honeypots to detect automatic large-scale attacks, honeyd [22] and nepenthes [2] among others. The first Internet traffic monitors known as Network Telescopes, Black Holes or Internet Sinks were presented by Moore et al. [21] .
The Euskalert honeynet [16] , whose SSH data are analysed in this article, has been monitoring attacks against well-known services. A network of honeypots has been deployed in the Basque Country (northern Spain), where eight companies and institutions have installed one of the project's sensors behind the firewalls of their corporate networks. The honeypot sensor transmits all the traffic received to a database via a secure communication channel. These partners can consult information relative to their sensor (after a login process) as well as general statistics in the project's website. Once the system is fully established, the information available can be used to analyse attacks suffered by the honeynet at network and application level. Euskalert is a distributed honeypot network based on a Honeynet GenIII architecture [11] . As previously mentioned, the Euskalert sensors have also recorded the SSH sessions used to administer and maintain the different devices of the infrastructure.
ID has been previously approached from several different points of view; many different computational intelligence techniques-such as Genetic Programming [1] , Data Mining [5, 12, 17] , Expert Systems [18] , Fuzzy Logic [29] or Neural Networks [15, 25, 31] among others-together with statistical [20] and signature verification [23] techniques have been applied mainly to perform a two-class classification (normal/anomalous or intrusive/non-intrusive). More precisely, attacks to SSH service have attracted researchers' attention for a long time. Song et al. [28] analysed timing and keystroke attacks. Researchers have also used honeypots to study and analyse attacks to this protocol, focusing on login attempts and dictionary attacks [8, 19] . In Koniaris et al. [19] , the authors analyse SSH attacks on honeypots focusing on visualization of the gathered data.
Considering the data capture, as previously introduced, this study takes advantage of the Euskalert project. Its data have been analysed and processed in different ways to determine the best approach for the detection of SSH anomalous connections.
In this contribution, Section 2 presents the approaches under study, applied to the SSH data described in Section 3. The experimental results are described in Section 4, while some conclusions and lines of future work are introduced in Section 5.
Proposed approaches
Many different formulae could be applied for the detection of SSH-based attacks. This study analyses some of them, based on three main stages:
1. Data collection: network data may be summarized in several different ways. In this work, honeynet data are proposed to be collected at the packet level and as TCP flows. Further details of the proposed approaches for each one of these stages are described in the following sections.
Data collection
As previously mentioned, data from Euskalert honeynet regarding SSH sessions are targeted in this work. Those data are proposed to be analysed in two different ways. Then, the traffic has been processed to obtain the SSH sessions out of the packets. The approach for defining an SSH session was based on the TCP logic, using packets with the same source IP, same destination IP and a common source and destination port. Source port is a non-privileged port number that remains the same during any TCP session. The features that were extracted from each one of the sessions in the data set are described in Table 2 .
Data analysis
One of the most interesting features of IDSs would be their capability to automatically detect whether a portion of the traffic circulating the network is an attack or normal traffic. This task is more challenging when confronting brand-new bad-intentioned activities with no previous samples.
Automated learning models (classifiers) [3] are well-known algorithms designed specifically for the purpose of deciding about previously unseen data. This issue makes them suitable for the IDS task. Going one step further, ensemble methods [27] combine multiple algorithms into one usually more accurate than the best of its components. Hence, the main idea behind ensemble learning is to take advantage of classification algorithms diversity to face more complex data [26] . For this reason, this study proposes the combination of classifiers to get more accurate results when detecting anomalous and intrusive events.
A wide variety of automated learning techniques have been applied in this study to classify SSH connections. Several base classifiers as well as different ways of combining them have been considered for the analysis of Euskalert data. These base classifiers have been combined according to 
Validation schemes
For a more comprehensive study, two different CV schemes have been applied in this work, namely 10K-fold and 5 × 2 [30] . They are applied to check how suitable are the learning models for the addressed problem (detection of SSH malicious connections). In case where the best model is found for both CV schemes when applied to a certain data arrangement, it could be said that the classifier and the ensemble are clearly the best ones.
To fulfil the requirements of the ID task, a two-stage process is proposed, as depicted in Figure 1 . The first stage was already discussed in González et al. [13] and was carried out by using the features of the SSH sessions to test the classification performance of different classifiers and ensembles, by means of WEKA software [14] . The best combination (with a classification rate of 100%) of a base classifier and an ensemble was obtained by combining the decision table classifier and the Adaboost ensemble.
Nevertheless, for real-life SSH ID it is important to take into account that the amount of training data will always be smaller than the amount of data gathered when working on a real context. As a consequence, the selection of data analysis models (both base classifier and ensemble) should be assessed with a more realistic validation scheme. Thereby, a second stage has been accomplished to assure that the chosen classifier may be applied in a real situation, where there are usually more samples for testing than for training. In the second stage, proposed in this article, the base classifier 'decision table' is applied. This classifier has been trained again in combination with five different ensembles for verifying that it is suitable for real data. For this new training, a 5 × 2 CV scheme has being used. The new ensembles and validation schemas have been developed specifically.
Experimental validation on real data
The performance of the proposed approaches has been assessed using real data sets, coming from the Euskalert project [10] . Detailed information about the data and the run experiments is provided in this section.
The experimental study has been performed by extracting SSH data related to 34 months of real attacks and administration tasks that reached the eight sensors of the Euskalert project. Data from such a long time period guarantee that a broad variety of situations are considered. This honeynet system receives 4000 packets a month on average. The complete data set from Euskalert contains a total of 2,647,074 packets, including TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic received by the distributed honeypot sensors. For this experiment, SSH data from connections that happened between May 2008 and March 2011 have been selected. Additionally, traffic containing real attacks to the SSH port and SSH connections to the system management port have been filtered out. This way, system management traffic is considered as benign traffic, and SSH connections coming from unknown IP sources are considered as malicious.
As stated in Section 2.1, two different data sets have been generated: the first data set contains the packet-level data and amounts to 209 administration (legitimate) packets and 37,990 anomalous packets. Table 3 shows the range of each selected feature (described in Table 1 ), depending on the nature of the session (administration or anomalous).
Out of the packets, the session-based data set was also extracted, containing 82 administration sessions and 8477 anomalous sessions. Table 4 shows the range of each feature, depending on the nature of the session (administrator or attack).
Results
This section presents the results obtained by the different approaches proposed in this article. For clarity and brevity, the average classification rate (%) for each ensemble applied to the n folders is provided, together with the maximum value and the standard deviation in Tables 5 and 6 . Figures 2  and 3 show the boxplots associated with the classification rates of the different ensembles when applying the two alternative validation schemes. For independent analysis, classification rates for both packet-based and TCP-sessions data sets are presented. The results are then discussed for each one of the stages to which alternatives are proposed.
As can be seen in Tables 5 and 6 , the best-performance classifier in the different proposed alternatives is Bagging. Thus, Table 7 shows the confusion matrices for such ensemble. The amounts in this table are the cumulative results, according to the validation schemes (10K and 5 × 2). In the case of the 10K folder scheme, data in confusion matrices are the sum of the results for the 10 folders. As each one of them applies to 10% of the data, the total amount of data is the size of the data set (10 times 10%), i.e. 38,199 packets and 8559 sessions. On the other hand, for the 5 × 2 validation scheme, each folder comprises 50% of the data and there are 10 folders as well. Thus, the matrices on the right side of Table 7 One of the main issues to be highlighted from Tables 5 and 6 is that Bagging is the ensemble attaining the best performance in all cases (different data sets and validation schemes). Its average classification rate (for the 10 classifiers) is always superior to that of other ensembles. Additionally, the best classification rate (max.) for a single classifier is always one of the highest for such ensemble.
According to the data collection issue, it can be seen that classification results are on average (for the different ensembles) higher in the case of packet-based SSH data set. Furthermore, the maximum classification rates are also obtained for this data set, despite the fact that it reaches 100% for some of the base classifiers combined with certain ensembles on session data set.
Through the evaluation by 10K versus 5 × 2, as shown in Tables 5 and 6 , it can be said that 5 × 2 is more strict as the classification rates are always lower than in the case of 10K-fold (except for the MultiboostingAB when applied to packet data set). However, for the best results (Table 7) , it can be said that false-negative rate (FNR) is lower for 5 × 2 in the case of SSH packet data set.
From Table 7 , it can be said that false-positive rates (FPRs) and FNRs are good enough to validate the proposed stages of SSH ID. The FNR reaches its lowest value (00.012%) when validating the SSH session data set by 10K, as only one attack session is misclassified. In the case of packet-based data set, the FNR is lower for the 5 × 2 CV scheme. On the other hand, the FPR takes its lowest value (00.028%) when validating the SSH packet data set by 10K.
Final conclusions
As the SSH is mainly used for administration purposes, and hence it manages critical information, it is potentially a dangerous protocol. In this article, several strategies and approaches are compared to validate its performance on the detection of SSH-based attacks.
The following main conclusions can be drawn from the proposed alternatives at the different ID stages, according to the experimental results in previous section:
1. Data collection: by gathering data at the packet level, the obtained classification results are better (on average) than those from session-based data. 2. Data analysis: Bagging is the ensemble attaining the best performance in all cases. 3. Result evaluation: 5 × 2 is more strict than 10K-fold.
